February 19, 2009

John Hemption wrote a piece on Bronte Capital titled Bank Solvency and the Geithner Plan:

The spread between the origination value of a loan and its secondary value is huge. It simply makes no sense to originate new loans when you can buy old loans so cheap. Because it makes no sense to originate loans banks will not do it unless they are driven by an “institutional imperative” (they don’t know what else to do) or they are forced to by regulators or they are trying to prove their solvency by using capital (something I have accused Barclays of).

James Hamilton of Econbrowser picks up the thread in a post titled Prospects for the US Banking System but he is handicapped by the notion that markets are efficient and rational:

As I understand it, Hempton is claiming that there is a probability distribution for what the true value of the assets held to maturity is going to be– might be higher than 75 cents, might be lower than 75 cents, but with expected value of 75 cents. There’s no question that risk premia at the moment are very high, but a figure of a 15% expected return seems hard to defend. The highest differential we’ve seen between Baa-rated and Aaa-rated bonds over the last century was 550 basis points in 1932. The spread fell from 340 basis points in December 2008 to 310 this January.

If purchasing bank assets today at 50 cents on the dollar doesn’t offer an expected return as high as 15%, then it’s hard to claim that the expected value of the assets held to maturity is as high as 75 cents. Either 50 cents is too low a valuation, or 75 cents is too high an expectation.

Although I’m not sure which numbers to use, this seems like exactly the right way to frame the problem. Figure out what are the possible parameters for the capital loss that is to be allocated among the various parties– specifically, a loss that must be borne by some combination of stockholders, creditors, managers, employees, and the taxpayers– and try to reconcile those numbers with the current liquidation value of the banks.

Assiduous Readers will remember the Bank of England April ’08 Financial Stability Report, which opined that banks were, in fact, over-reserved against losses to maturity. That was, of course, nearly a year ago, back in the good old days before Lehman blew up and took the economy with it. I can only hope that some similarly authoritative work will become public soon.

Split-shares got creamed again … much more of this and retraction will become attractive again! It wasn’t just that bids disappeared, either … there were willing sellers at low prices.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.25 % 3.68 % 23,617 17.99 2 -0.0255 % 860.4
FixedFloater 7.31 % 6.83 % 73,542 14.01 7 -1.1406 % 1,373.5
Floater 5.08 % 4.29 % 28,787 16.85 4 0.4864 % 1,033.5
OpRet 5.23 % 4.87 % 141,082 3.98 15 0.2227 % 2,056.3
SplitShare 6.72 % 11.98 % 67,429 3.96 15 -2.7117 % 1,665.0
Interest-Bearing 7.12 % 9.26 % 33,029 0.82 2 -0.5202 % 1,987.4
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0881 % 1,548.6
Perpetual-Discount 6.95 % 7.11 % 181,051 12.43 71 0.0881 % 1,426.2
FixedReset 6.05 % 5.73 % 584,611 13.93 27 0.2203 % 1,818.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
FBS.PR.B SplitShare -9.08 % Yes, Virginia, there was volume there. Closed at 6.41-59, 5×10, after trading 26,952 shares in a range of 6.40-10. Asset coverage of 1.0+:1 as of February 12 according to TD Securities.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2011-12-15
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 6.41
Bid-YTW : 23.44 %
LBS.PR.A SplitShare -8.51 % Volume here, too. Traded 23,150 shares in a range of 7.00-8.00 before closing at 7.10-80, 24×77. Asset coverage of 1.3-:1 as of February 12 according to Brompton.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2013-11-29
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 7.10
Bid-YTW : 14.03 %
FTN.PR.A SplitShare -6.53 % Volume here too! Traded 9,800 shares in a range of 7.11-50 before closing at 7.01-27, 10×2. Asset coverage of 1.2-:1 as of February 13 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 7.01
Bid-YTW : 11.98 %
DF.PR.A SplitShare -4.44 % Asset coverage of 1.3+:1 as of February 13 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.18
Bid-YTW : 9.56 %
BCE.PR.Z FixedFloater -4.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 15.05
Bid-YTW : 7.06 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -3.68 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-19
Maturity Price : 16.23
Evaluated at bid price : 16.23
Bid-YTW : 7.13 %
FFN.PR.A SplitShare -3.36 % Asset coverage of 1.0+:1 as of February 13 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 6.33
Bid-YTW : 15.23 %
LFE.PR.A SplitShare -2.85 % Asset coverage of 1.2+:1 as of February 13 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 7.84
Bid-YTW : 12.83 %
WFS.PR.A SplitShare -2.82 % Asset coverage of 1.1+:1 as of February 12 according to Mulvihill.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2011-06-30
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 7.58
Bid-YTW : 18.97 %
BCE.PR.R FixedFloater -2.73 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 15.32
Bid-YTW : 6.82 %
NA.PR.N FixedReset -2.65 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-19
Maturity Price : 21.95
Evaluated at bid price : 22.00
Bid-YTW : 4.93 %
SBC.PR.A SplitShare -2.42 % Asset coverage of 1.4-:1 as of February 12 according to Brompton.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-11-30
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 7.66
Bid-YTW : 13.65 %
DFN.PR.A SplitShare -2.18 % Asset coverage of 1.6-:1 as of February 13 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.51
Bid-YTW : 8.72 %
PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -2.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-19
Maturity Price : 19.42
Evaluated at bid price : 19.42
Bid-YTW : 7.17 %
TD.PR.P Perpetual-Discount -1.93 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-19
Maturity Price : 19.81
Evaluated at bid price : 19.81
Bid-YTW : 6.71 %
RY.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -1.65 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-19
Maturity Price : 17.31
Evaluated at bid price : 17.31
Bid-YTW : 6.55 %
CM.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.56 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-19
Maturity Price : 16.39
Evaluated at bid price : 16.39
Bid-YTW : 7.43 %
PPL.PR.A SplitShare -1.23 % Asset coverage of 1.3+:1 as of February 13 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.05
Bid-YTW : 11.62 %
TD.PR.N OpRet -1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.52
Bid-YTW : 4.21 %
FIG.PR.A Interest-Bearing -1.20 % Asset coverage of 1.0+:1 as of February 10, based on Capital units at $0.72 and 0.53 Capital Units per preferred.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-31
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 7.41
Bid-YTW : 13.02 %
TCA.PR.Y Perpetual-Discount -1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-19
Maturity Price : 44.69
Evaluated at bid price : 46.26
Bid-YTW : 6.08 %
BAM.PR.H OpRet 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.50
Bid-YTW : 8.33 %
BNS.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-19
Maturity Price : 18.34
Evaluated at bid price : 18.34
Bid-YTW : 6.63 %
NA.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-19
Maturity Price : 20.91
Evaluated at bid price : 20.91
Bid-YTW : 7.06 %
TD.PR.C FixedReset 1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-19
Maturity Price : 24.20
Evaluated at bid price : 24.25
Bid-YTW : 5.12 %
BNS.PR.R FixedReset 1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-19
Maturity Price : 21.76
Evaluated at bid price : 21.80
Bid-YTW : 4.77 %
BNS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-19
Maturity Price : 20.01
Evaluated at bid price : 20.01
Bid-YTW : 6.64 %
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-19
Maturity Price : 15.15
Evaluated at bid price : 15.15
Bid-YTW : 7.50 %
TD.PR.A FixedReset 1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-19
Maturity Price : 22.56
Evaluated at bid price : 22.60
Bid-YTW : 4.66 %
BNS.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-19
Maturity Price : 17.75
Evaluated at bid price : 17.75
Bid-YTW : 6.42 %
BNS.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-19
Maturity Price : 17.74
Evaluated at bid price : 17.74
Bid-YTW : 6.42 %
RY.PR.L FixedReset 1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-19
Maturity Price : 24.06
Evaluated at bid price : 24.10
Bid-YTW : 5.08 %
ENB.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.56 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-19
Maturity Price : 23.82
Evaluated at bid price : 24.07
Bid-YTW : 5.73 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 1.56 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-19
Maturity Price : 13.00
Evaluated at bid price : 13.00
Bid-YTW : 4.08 %
SLF.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.76 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-19
Maturity Price : 15.02
Evaluated at bid price : 15.02
Bid-YTW : 7.56 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.79 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-19
Maturity Price : 15.32
Evaluated at bid price : 15.32
Bid-YTW : 7.50 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset 2.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-19
Maturity Price : 22.25
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 4.87 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 2.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-19
Maturity Price : 16.02
Evaluated at bid price : 16.02
Bid-YTW : 7.57 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 2.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-19
Maturity Price : 16.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.00
Bid-YTW : 7.34 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.G FixedReset 76,155 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.31
Bid-YTW : 6.10 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 66,176 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 6.11 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 52,186 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.41
Bid-YTW : 6.00 %
RY.PR.P FixedReset 47,648 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.26
Bid-YTW : 6.18 %
BNS.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 46,670 Nesbitt bought 16,000 from Scotia at 17.75 and 21,800 from National at 17.99.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-19
Maturity Price : 17.75
Evaluated at bid price : 17.75
Bid-YTW : 6.42 %
CM.PR.L FixedReset 43,543 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.38
Bid-YTW : 6.27 %
There were 30 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

3 Responses to “February 19, 2009”

  1. Louis says:

    Thank you very much for the very interesting link to Bronte.

    On a totally other note, I first thought that the following news concerning NA was a good sign:

    “(Marketwire – Feb. 16, 2009) – National Bank of Canada
    (TSX:NA) announced today its intention to redeem, for the purpose of
    cancellation, all of its 5.70% debentures due April 16, 2014, on Thursday,
    April 16, 2009, for 100% of the principal amount of the debentures.
    The regular interest due in respect of the debentures on April 16, 2009 will
    be paid in the normal course, leaving no accrued and unpaid interest on the
    debentures at the time of their redemption.”

    But could not then refrain being (again) cynical about it linking this news with the only 15 days earlier news of the closing of NA’s last fixed reset issuance:

    “Jan 30, 2009: The Series 26 Preferred Shares will yield 6.60% annually, payable quarterly, for the initial period ending February 15, 2014…Therafter, the dividend rate will reset every five years at a level of 479 basis points over the then 5-year Government of Canada bond yield.”

    I fear you are gonna think that I am just not bright enough to understand but, here I am again:

    I understand that the above “moves” by the NA may make “capitalisation” sense and that people will say that I am mixing apples with oranges. However, money is money whether you call capital or a debenture and it “moneywise” does not make sense to me issuing prefs paying a non-tax deductible 6.6% dividend while using an equivalent amount of money (for the sake of the discussion here) to buy back debentures now which only cost a tax deductible 5.7% interest which does not mature until 2014.

    Bearing in mind that NA was more than meeting its regulatory capital requirements anyway beore its last issuance of resetables, wouldn’t it have been wiser not to issue the costly resetable at this particular time (when they are so expensive to issue due to the prevailing market conditions) and wait a bit longer before redeeming the debentures?

    I suspect you are going to say that capital is key since it allows the bank to lend “10” times that figure while borrowed money by way of the debenture doesn’t have that effect. However, does the NA have so much quality borrowers cuing up at their counters to borrow highly profitable (for the bank) loans? Not that I know.

    I also take it that it looks good to redeem debentures at the first opportunity and I recall the DB having been highly criticised for not having done so but its shareholders now appear to accept that it is what had to be done. I submit that the market is weel beyond the “if it looks good, it must be good” stage? We are going through extremely difficult times such that I don’t understand why should our bankers even feel guilty of having to get closer to the minimum required tier 1 capital ratio if adding a cushion doesn’t impress anyone anyway (unless, obviously, more write-offs are to come). We are in a confidence crisis and the only way to fix this is, in my opinion, by stopping playing games.

    One should increase his capital cushion when things go well, not in times of troubles when you most need it. Doing the opposite makes longer, costier and more painful the recovery. You cannot fixing the under-capitalisation now, it is when time will get better that I hope we will remember.

    Buying back all these resetable in five years or letting them reset is going to come up quite expensive (I doubt very much the 5years Canadas will be anywhere near what it is now). Inflation will be back making high returns expectations even higher.

    So, what is wrong with my thinking here?

  2. […] Reader Louis writes in and says: Thank you very much for the very interesting link to […]

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