November 12, 2008

The Fed and other US regulators have released a motherhood statement on banking practices:

  • DO lend to your regular customers
  • DON’T pay excessive dividends
  • DON’T be unnecessarily mean to delinquent mortgagees
  • DON’T pay dumb bonuses to management

A nod’s as good as a wink to a blind man, eh?

On September 25 I predicted that TARP would fail for the same reason MLEC failed: disagreement over valuation of assets. So I pleased to see that Paulson has abandoned the asset-buying idea:

U.S. Secretary Henry Paulson plans to use the second half of the $700 billion financial rescue program to help relieve pressures on consumer credit, scrapping an effort to buy devalued mortgage assets.

Paulson’s remarks are an acknowledgement that the centerpiece of the $700 billion bailout request to lawmakers was ill-conceived. Neel Kashkari, the Treasury official who heads the rescue program, told legislators last month that officials shifted to buying stakes in banks because it was a faster way revive capital markets and the economy.

“I will never apologize for changing a strategy or an approach if the facts change,” Paulson said.

The nice part about being part of a lame-duck administration – or working out your notice at McDonalds, or whatever – is the joyous feeling of being able to tell the truth and behave intelligently! Accrued Interest mourns the plan’s failure.

Spend-every-Penny has announced a $50-billion mortgage swap with Canadian Banks:

The Honourable Jim Flaherty, Minister of Finance, today announced the Government will purchase up to an additional $50 billion of insured mortgage pools by the end of the fiscal year as part of its ongoing efforts to maintain the availability of longer-term credit in Canada.

This action will increase to $75 billion the maximum value of securities purchased through Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) under this program.

Also announced was:

Jon Danielsson reviews the Icelandic situation on VoxEU:

A third of the population is considering emigration.

Does anybody remember Richard Rohmer’s book, Exodus UK?

The first main cause of the crisis was the use of inflation targeting. Throughout the period of inflation targeting, inflation was generally above its target rate. In response, the central bank keep rates high, exceeding 15% at times.

In a small economy like Iceland, high interest rates encourage domestic firms and households to borrow in foreign currency; it also attracts carry traders speculating against ‘uncovered interest parity’. The result was a large foreign-currency inflow. This lead to a sharp exchange rate appreciation that gave Icelanders an illusion of wealth and doubly rewarding the carry traders. The currency inflows also encouraged economic growth and inflation; outcomes that induced the Central Bank to raise interest rates further.

The end result was a bubble caused by the interaction of high domestic interest rates, currency appreciation, and capital inflows. While the stylized facts about currency inflows suggest that they should lead to lower domestic prices, in Iceland the impact was opposite.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30.
The Fixed-Reset index was added effective 2008-9-5 at that day’s closing value of 1,119.4 for the Fixed-Floater index.
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A
Fixed-Floater 4.97% 4.93% 68,727 15.72 6 -0.7563% 1,054.3
Floater 7.21% 7.34% 52,104 12.06 2 -2.9500% 483.7
Op. Retract 5.27% 5.99% 137,280 3.85 15 -0.0078% 1,003.7
Split-Share 6.32% 10.80% 56,532 3.90 12 -0.2896% 935.1
Interest Bearing 8.10% 15.22% 56,536 3.25 3 -1.4779% 876.9
Perpetual-Premium N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Perpetual-Discount 6.88% 6.96% 176,297 12.62 71 -0.4212% 792.7
Fixed-Reset 5.37% 5.11% 949,807 15.15 12 -0.2776% 1,084.7
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -4.2806% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.13% based on a bid of 16.10 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 16.10-50, 4×5. Day’s range 16.07-50.
PWF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -3.0937% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.00% based on a bid of 21.30 and a limitMaturity. Closing Quote 21.30-24, 2×3. Day’s range of 21.28-97.
BCE.PR.I FixFloat -3.0638%  
BAM.PR.J OpRet -3.0405% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 10.98% based on a bid of 17.22 and a softMaturity 2018-3-30 at 25.00. Compare with BAM.PR.H (8.40% to 2012-3-30), BAM.PR.I (9.49% to 2013-12-30) and BAM.PR.O (11.46% to 2013-6-30). Closing quote of 17.22-83, 3×11. Day’s range of 17.17-00.
BAM.PR.B Floater -2.9592%  
PWF.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -2.9484% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.36% based on a bid of 19.75 and a limitMaturity. Closing Quote 19.75-74, 5×1. No Trades.
BAM.PR.K Floater -2.9412%  
FBS.PR.B SplitShare -2.9240% Asset coverage of 1.4+:1 as of November 6 according to TD Securities. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 11.85% based on a bid of 8.30 and a hardMaturity 2011-12-15 at 10.00. Closing quote of 8.30-94, 20×10. Day’s range of 8.40-55.
BCE.PR.R FixFloat -2.7484%  
HSB.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -2.7322% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.30% based on a bid of 17.80 and a limitMaturity. Closing Quote 17.80-38, 9×2. Day’s range of 17.50-18.90.
W.PR.J PerpetualDiscount -2.4051% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.79% based on a bid of 18.26 and a limitMaturity. Closing Quote 18.26-35, 2×4. Day’s range of 18.25-70.
BAM.PR.O OpRet -2.3500% See BAM.PR.J, above.
PWF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -2.3256% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.62% based on a bid of 21.00 and a limitMaturity. Closing Quote 21.00-25, 2×4. Day’s range of 21.01-50.
FIG.PR.A InterestBearing -2.1935% Asset coverage of 1.3-:1 as of November 11, based on a Capital Unit NAV of 3.92 and 0.71 Capital Units per Preferred. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 12.25% based on a bid of 7.58% and a hardMaturity 2014-12-31 at 10.00. Closing quote of 7.58-80, 2×1. Day’s range of 7.58-75.
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -2.1480% Asset coverage of just under 2.8:1 as of September 30 according to the company. Coverage now of 2.0+:1 based on BAM.A at 21.04 and 2.4 BAM.A held per preferred. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 14.15% based on a bid of 12.30 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00. Compare with BNA.PR.A (16.58% to 2010-9-30) and BNA.PR.B (9.38% to 2016-3-25). Closing quote 12.30-56, 2×5. Day’s range 12.27-41.
MFC.PR.B PerpetualDiscount +2.1690% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.62% based on a bid of 17.90 and a limitMaturity. Closing Quote 17.90-15, 5X3. Day’s range of 17.75-29.
RY.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +2.9994% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.14% based on a bid of 18.20 and a limitMaturity. Closing Quote 18.20-35, 7×3. Day’s range of 17.50-35.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
GWO.PR.X OpRet 248,528 CIBC crossed 175,000 at 25.00, then another 68,500 at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.73% based on a bid of 25.25 and a softMaturity 2013-9-29 at 25.00.
PWF.PR.D OpRet 93,600 CIBC crossed 89,000 at 25.25. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.00% based on a bid of 25.25 and a softMaturity 2012-10-30 at 25.00.
PWF.PR.J OpRet 85,781 CIBC crossed 85,000 at 25.00. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.05% based on a bid of 24.71 and a softMaturity 2013-7-30 at 25.00.
TD.PR.C Fixed-Reset 76,840 CIBC crossed 50,000 at 25.00.
RY.PR.L FixedReset 65,850  

There were thirty-one other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

2 Responses to “November 12, 2008”

  1. lystgl says:

    It’s awfully nice of Mr. Flaherty to be so generous with taxpayers’ money but begs the question: If our banks and bankers are in such good shape, there’s no danger here of the kinds of defaults we’re seeing in the U.S. and abroad; why is he doing it? Quite frankly it makes me more than a little nervous that something may very well be rotten here in the state of Canada.

  2. […] Readers will remember that on November 12 I referenced previous predictions that TARP (the asset-buying part) would fail for the same reason […]

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